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NOTE
Is THERE A DORMANT EXTRATERRITORIALITY
PRINCIPLE?: COMMERCE CLAUSE LIMITS
ON STATE ANTITRUST LAWS
Michael J. Ruttinger*
State antitrust laws ordinarily supplement federal law by providing
a cause of action for anticompetitive activity that occurs in the
state. Some states, however, have construed their antitrust regimes
to reach conduct that occurs outside the state's boundaries. Such
regulation raises significant federalism and Commerce Clause con-
cerns by creating possible extraterritorial liability for conduct with
virtually no in-state effect. This Note examines two Commerce Clause
standards that may limit the degree to which state antitrust laws may
exercise extraterritorial force-the "dormant" or "negative" Com-
merce Clause and the so-called "Extraterritorial Principle."
Unfortunately, the dormant Commerce Clause test, as articulated in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., is an overly malleable and ineffective
limit. In contrast, the Extraterritoriality Principle is a powerful per
se restraint; however, the Supreme Court has not provided clear
guidance for when to apply the rule. Accordingly, this Note advocates
an "Inconsistency Principle" as the best way to understand the
Court's concern with extraterritorial regulation. State antitrust laws
should not have extraterritorial force when they would impose incon-
sistent legal obligations on the out-of-state defendant.
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INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law provides broad remedies for many kinds of anticompetitive
conduct, and plaintiffs frequently turn to federal antitrust statutes to attack
obstacles to fair competition. Federal law, however, has never been the sole
source of relief. Prior to the adoption of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890,'
state laws offered the exclusive remedy for restraints on trade. Even now
neither state nor federal regimes operate wholly independent of each other.
2
Rather, the laws supplement one another as part of a two-tier enforcement
scheme in which the federal laws are meant to complement, not replace,
state laws.3 This scheme generally works well, allowing plaintiffs to reach
broad, interstate monopolies under federal law while using the laws of their
home state to address in-state price-fixing.
The beginnings of a dangerous trend have emerged among state courts
in recent years, threatening to destabilize the long and harmonious relation-
ship between federal and state antitrust regimes. Judges are increasingly
willing to ascribe extraterritorial reach to state antitrust laws,4 permitting
plaintiffs who would otherwise sue out-of-state corporations under the
Sherman Act to forum shop and reach these defendants within the comfort
of a more favorable state forum. Although state laws often reach some out-
of-state activity,5 these claims become problematic and raise alarming feder-
alism and Commerce Clause concerns when they create extraterritorial
liability for conduct that occurred predominantly out-of-state and had very
little, if any, in-state effect. For instance, the Harmar Bottling Company re-
6cently sued the Coca-Cola Company alleging monopolistic practices.
Although the suit could have been brought as a Sherman Act action, Harmar
instead relied on the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983 to
claim damages for anticompetitive conduct negotiated and implemented in
1. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
2. Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375, 375 (1983).
3. 21 CONG. REC. 2456-57 (1890). Senator Sherman described the act's purpose as "sup-
plement[ing] the enforcement of the established rules of the common and statute law by the courts
of the several States in dealing with combinations that affect injuriously the industrial liberty of the
citizens of these States. It is to arm the Federal courts within the limits of their constitutional power
that they may co-operate with the State courts...." Id. at 2457 (emphasis added).
4. California and Texas courts stand out for having interpreted their antitrust laws to have
broad out-of-state reach. See, e.g., RLH Indus, Inc. v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 469,
478-81 (Ct. App. 2005); Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2006).
5. Given the interwoven nature of interstate commerce, it is rare for any transaction to have
absolutely no out-of-state effect. Even relatively discrete transactions impose aggregate effects on
interstate commerce. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
6. Harmar,218S.W.3d671.
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three states other than Texas.7 Moreover, applying Texas law in a Texas fo-
rum to conduct occurring in four different states was not the most disturbing
aspect of the case; the challenged agreements between soft drink bottlers
and retailers, which governed the advertising, display, and sale of products,
were legal under the antitrust laws of the three other states.8
The Harmar decision is not an aberration; it is one of the more salient
examples of a trend broadening state antitrust jurisdiction. Although the
Texas Supreme Court overturned the jury's $15.6 million dollar verdict,9
other courts continue to expand the reach and potency of their states' stat-
utes. For instance, the California Supreme Court has refused to reconsider at
least one case applying the state's Cartwright Antitrust Act to allegedly anti-
competitive conduct involving no in-state defendants or alleged in-state
activity.'0 The Court of Appeals in RLH Industries, Inc. v. SBC Communica-
tions, Inc. held that the act could apply to wholly out-of-state conduct." The
plaintiffs in RLH alleged that SBC impermissibly required its clients to use
SBC-provided high voltage equipment of the same kind produced and mar-
keted by RLH, thus diminishing its ability to sell the product. Like the court
in Harmar, the RLH court failed to recognize that SBC's conduct was legal
in those other states. Unlike Harmar, however, the RLH decision demon-
strated an even more worrisome side effect of extraterritorially applied
antitrust laws because the arrangements in these other states were mandated
by SBC's filed tariffs, each operating with the force of law. Accordingly,
anything short of the very conduct RLH complained of would have exposed
SBC to liability for violating its tariffs in each state.
2
Harmar and RLH are two examples of a problem that has the potential
to spiral out of control if more states apply their powerful antitrust remedies
to transactions already governed by another state's laws. Profes-
sor Hovenkamp has observed that this danger is particularly high in the case
7. Id. at 680.
8. MICHAEL S. GREVE, INTERSTATE COMITY: CHEERS FOR TEXAS 3-4, 15 n.2 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070330_InterstateComity.pdf.
9. Harmar, 218 S.W.3d 671. Despite the opportunity, the Texas Supreme Court did not
address the need for a Commerce Clause solution to extraterritorial enforcement. Rather, the court
rejected the trend towards extraterritorial enforcement and held that the statute did not afford a cause
of action for out-of-state conduct. Id. at 683 ("The TFEAA does not, in clear language, afford a
cause of action for injury outside the state, and we will not imply one.").
10. RLH Indus., Inc. v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 469, 479 (Ct. App. 2005)
("The weight of this authority leads us to reject SBC's contention the commerce clause prevents
California antitrust and unfair competition law from reaching its allegedly anticompetitive HVP
policies in other states....").
11. Id. at 480-81. The court agreed that the Commerce Clause may limit how far a state may
reach to apply its own antitrust laws, but it did not determine whether the application of the
Cartwright Act in the instant case reached too far. Rather than disagreeing with the Commerce
Clause as an appropriate limit on extraterritorial enforcement, this Note disapproves of the standard
that the RLH court would have used in such an analysis.
12. Id. (observing that the tariffs may create a conflict between California law and the law in
each state in which SBC has a filed tariff).
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of indirect-purchaser remedies provided by many antitrust statutes. 3 These
laws are state-created remedies that undermine the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, which held that only the "direct
purchaser," often a middleman or retailer, could sue a product manufacturer
for a price-fixing arrangement.14 Many states responded to the ruling by en-
acting their own indirect-purchaser laws, which give individual consumers a
cause of action that they lack under federal law. 5 Aggressive extraterritorial
application of these remedies could cause major downstream problems be-
cause their application on a national scale may cause defendants to unfairly
pay treble damages on multiple occasions for the same price-fixing transac-
tion.16 Moreover, while federal law at least permits these defendants to have
their case tried in federal court, defendants sued under extraterritorially en-
forced laws can be reached in the courts of a state in which they have no
business presence, limited only by the enacting state's ability to obtain per-
sonal jurisdiction.'7
The Constitution has historically enforced territorial limits on the states
and prohibited states from exporting their laws across state lines." The
Commerce Clause context is unique, however, because territorial limits have
retained their vitality. '9 Thus, although states may apply their own antitrust
regimes to out-of-state conduct, the alleged violation must have "a sufficient
effect within the state., 20 As a result, the Commerce Clause theoretically
precludes any state from enforcing its law extraterritorially where the alleg-
edly unlawful conduct had no in-state effect or where enforcement would
impede "the free flow of trade between States."2'
13. Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 432.
14. 431 U.S. 720, 729 (1977).
15. See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 432.
16. Id. To remedy this problem, Professor Hovenkamp argues that extraterritorial application
of state antitrust laws "ought to be limited to those instances when the state court has specific per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant or when the cause of action arises out of the defendant's
activities within the forum state." Id. The solution offered in this Note seeks to resolve the same
problem as Hovenkamp's article, although it challenges his apparent assumption that the Court has
foreclosed a "dormant" Commerce Clause challenge from succeeding on this question.
17. Id. Laws such as California's Cartwright Act, which is applied to the full extent of its
constitutional power and yet "contravene[s] federal policy by giving indirect purchasers a cause of
action for damages," create particularly important extraterritoriality problems. Id. at 401.
18. See, e.g., Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422, 427 (1947) ("From
the Commerce Clause itself, there comes, also, an abridgment of the state's power to tax within its
territorial limits. This has arisen from long-continued judicial interpretation that, without congres-
sional action, the words themselves of the Commerce Clause forbid undue interferences by the
states with interstate commerce ....".); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) ("The authority
of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is estab-
lished.").
19. Strict territorial limits in many other areas have fallen away. For example, personal juris-
diction is no longer limited by state borders. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945) (expanding the strict concept of personal jurisdiction in Pennoyer by applying a "minimum
contacts" test).
20. Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 382.
21. Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
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Behind the Court's deceptively simple antagonism towards extraterrito-
rial legislation lurk two arcane doctrines used interchangeably despite a very
real potential to contradict each other. The first, and older, of these rules is
located in the "dormant" Commerce Clause and uses an ill-defined balanc-
ing test to assess statutes that regulate "even-handedly," and as such impose
incidental burdens on interstate commerce . 2 This deferential standard, well-
known as the Pike balancing test, invalidates a statute only when the burden
imposed is "clearly excessive" compared to the regulating state's interests.
23
In stark contrast, the second rule-also described as part of the dormant24
Commerce Clause. -provides a bright-line alternative. This so-called "Ex-
traterritoriality Principle" embodies the simple proposition that states may
not legislate extraterritorially; 25 it establishes a per se bar against state laws
regulating commerce occurring "'wholly outside of the State's borders.' ,26
A problem immediately becomes obvious. By forcing two doctrines that
take opposite approaches to analyzing the validity of a law into the rubric of
the dormant Commerce Clause,27 courts "subject[] state initiatives that reach
beyond a state's borders to a constitutional doctrine that rests on an unstable
legal foundation .' 2s
The Pike balancing test and the Extraterritoriality Principle are distinct
standards that create an apparently intractable conflict when they overlap,
yet the Supreme Court has provided no meaningful guidance on when each
standard applies. 29 Accordingly, judges cannot discern which rule to apply to
statutes that are facially neutral, regulate evenhandedly, but incidentally cre-
ate liability for out-of-state conduct. To the extent the Court has addressed
22. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
23. Id. The balancing approach is controversial and heavily criticized by the Court's conser-
vative members. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("I would ... abandon the 'balancing' approach to these negative Commerce
Clause cases ... and leave essentially legislative judgments to the Congress.").
24. Peter C. Felmly, Comment, Beyond the Reach of the States: The Dormant Commerce
Clause, Extraterritorial State Regulation, and the Concerns of Federalism, 55 ME. L. REV. 467, 505
(2003) ("Marrying the extraterritoriality principle to an already besieged dormant Commerce Clause
... expands an ailing body of jurisprudence .... ).
25. Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (11) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1865, 1874-75 (1987).
26. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 642-43 (1982) (plurality opinion)).
27. Commentators such as Professor Regan underscore the problem of describing both stan-
dards as part the same doctrine, observing that courts are not even settled on whether the
Extraterritoriality Principle should be a dormant Commerce clause issue. Regan, supra note 25, at
1884-85 ("In dormant commerce clause cases, courts and commentators write as if the extraterrito-
riality principle were grounded in the commerce clause. In conflicts cases, courts assign the
extraterritoriality principle to the due process clause or the full faith and credit clause indifferently
..... (footnote omitted)).
28. Felmly, supra note 24, at 505.
29. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)
("We have also recognized that there is no clear line separating the category of state regulation that




such situations-in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, ° for in-
stance-its opinions have only contributed to the doctrinal confusion. The
CTS Court examined an Indiana antitakeover law that protected in-state
companies from out-of-state control by requiring outside buyers to receive
approval from a majority of shareholders before obtaining voting rights.3'
Although the CTS Court upheld the statute, it remained unclear about which
test applied. Instead, the Court added yet another condition to the mix, ob-
serving that the Commerce Clause prohibits laws that "adversely affect
interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations. 32 At
least one commentator suggests that the holding added a condition to the
Extraterritoriality Principle, requiring that extraterritorial enforcement must
create an as yet undefined "inconsistency" to violate the Commerce
13Clause. Nevertheless, one can just as easily imagine the court upholding
the law by balancing the state's interest in protecting local shareholders
against the burden on out-of-state commerce.
This Note advocates the adoption of an "Inconsistency Principle" as an
alternative to the Pike test and the Extraterritoriality Principle, both of which
have failed as restraints on extraterritorial antitrust enforcement. Under the
Inconsistency Principle, extraterritorial application of a state's antitrust law
would be subject to a rule of per se invalidity when it imposes an inconsis-
tent legal obligation on conduct by forcing the regulated party to break the
law of one state in order to follow the law of another. Part I examines the
development of the balancing standard used in Pike v. Bruce Church and
observes that the doctrine apparently applies to extraterritorially applied
state antitrust laws, although this Note criticizes such an approach as unten-
able. Similarly, Part II explores the Extraterritoriality Principle as an
alternative limit and concludes that the rule is both too ambiguous and too
broad, frustrating the goal of a "two-tiered" federal and state antitrust re-
gime. Finally, Part III contends that adoption of the Inconsistency Principle
would adequately explain the court's heretofore unexplained concern with
"inconsistent" regulations and resolve the problems caused by extraterrito-
rial antitrust enforcement without resulting in a conflict between the Pike
balancing test and the Extraterritoriality Principle.
I. THE MODERN "DORMANT" COMMERCE CLAUSE BALANCING TEST
Courts assessing the validity of extraterritorially enforced state laws
have shown an inclination to apply the permissive Pike balancing test, even
where the complained of conduct occurs predominantly or wholly out-of-
30. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
31. CTS, 481 U.S. at 71-75.
32. Id. at 88.
33. Regan, supra note 25, at 1875 (suggesting that the concern with inconsistent regulations
may be a concern with extraterritoriality).
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state.34 Indeed, Pike remains good law and judges widely apply the test to
35determine the validity of state regulations affecting interstate commerce.
Accordingly, this Part seeks to explain the continued vitality of the Pike bal-
ancing test and why courts apply it as a limit on antitrust enforcement
despite heavy criticism. Section L.A follows the development of the modem
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, culminating in the Pike test. Section
I.B concludes that while courts have held that the balancing test is an appro-
priate restriction on state antitrust laws, it remains overly vague and far too
malleable to serve as an effective restraint.
A. Development of Modern "Dormant" Commerce Clause Doctrine
The dormant Commerce Clause permits states to regulate some com-
merce beyond their boundaries, so long as those regulations do not conflict
with federal law." The Court thus recognized a right for states to regulate in
areas deemed "local and not national," in which Congress had not enacted
legislation, and which did not require a uniform rule.37 As the concept de-
veloped, the distinction between national and local interests created
problems for the Court, which established no clear way to distinguish be-
tween the interests. Moreover, a "local-national" test did not consider the
purpose or effect of a regulation.3 s Thus in the early twentieth century, the
Court adopted a "direct-indirect" distinction designed to prohibit state regu-
39lations that directly burdened or impeded the flow of interstate commerce.
Yet still more problems arose, in part because the direct-indirect scheme
34. See, e.g., Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 668 P.2d 674, 688-89 (Cal. 1983)
(applying the Pike balancing test); RLH Indus., Inc. v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 469,
480-81 (Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting SBC's argument that extraterritorial enforcement violates the
Commerce Clause while expressing no opinion on "potentially relevant issues not yet litigated,
including a rigorous Pike analysis").
35. See, e.g., Carolina Trucks & Equip., Inc. v. Volvo Trucks of N. Am., Inc., 492 F.3d 484,
492 (4th Cir. 2007) (determining a broad reading of "sale" in the Dealers Act to be impermissible
under the dormant Commerce Clause balancing test); Weismueller v. Kosubucki, 492 F. Supp. 2d
1036, 1039 (W.D. Wis. 2007) ("Since the Wisconsin Supreme Court rule has only incidental effects
on interstate commerce the Pike balancing test applies.").
36. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,209-10 (1824) (suggesting that the states may
enact laws regulating commerce so long as those laws do not contradict or interfere with federal
laws).
37. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851). The Court determined
that while some subjects require national attention and must be governed by federal law, others are
of a particularly local concern and require diverse treatments. In Cooley, the Court determined that
local necessities of navigation warranted more local treatment and thus were proper subjects of state
regulation.
38. Felmly, supra note 24, at 473.
39. E.g., U.S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 326 (1918) ("It is settled that a
State may not directly burden interstate commerce, either by taxation or otherwise. But a tax that
only indirectly affects the profits or returns from such commerce is not within the rule."); Spector
Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 181 F.2d 150, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1950) ("The other test, that a tax
which directly burdens interstate commerce is invalid, while one which indirectly burdens such
commerce can be supported, furnished the criterion for decisions in this field for many years."),
rev'd, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
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"led to unpredictable and somewhat arbitrary decisions ' ' ° that failed to gar-
ner the support of the full Court.4'
In response to the shortcomings of its early dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, in the 1940s the Court purportedly simplified its previous• • 42
formula by describing the test as an all-inclusive balancing inquiry, which
the modem Court has developed into a nondiscrimination rule.43 Now, "[t]he
hallmark of the modem dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is the
Court's use of different levels of scrutiny," ranging from a per se prohibition
on discriminatory statutes to a balancing approach according legislative def-
erence for evenhanded ones. 44 The first standard-the per se rule of
invalidity-targets state regulations that discriminate between the economic
interests of states and serve a protectionist purpose.45 Courts impose a simi-
46larly strict standard on statutes discriminating in purpose or effect.
Yet even laws that do not discriminate on their face, but instead regulate
evenhandedly, may violate the Commerce Clause. Courts subject such laws
to the highly deferential Pike test.4 Pike and its progeny stand for the propo-
sition that even though a statute is facially neutral, a balancing of the
interests approach will determine whether a court should invalidate the law.
In Pike, the Court invalidated an Arizona statute that prohibited the ship-
ment in interstate commerce of cantaloupes grown in-state unless the
cantaloupe growers shipped them in containers identifying the cantaloupes
as Arizona-grown. Bruce Church sued to prohibit enforcement of the statute
because it sent its cantaloupes to be processed in a California plant, which
was the nearest processing facility.48 In response, the Court formulated a test
for such "evenhanded" statutes with only "incidental" burdens on interstate
40. Felmly, supra note 24, at 474.
41. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe tradi-
tional test of the limit of state action by inquiring whether the interference with commerce is direct
or indirect seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too remote from actu-
alities, to be of value. In thus making use of the expressions, 'direct' and 'indirect interference' with
commerce, we are doing little more than using labels to describe a result rather than any trustworthy
formula by which it is reached.").
42. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945) ("[T]he matters for ultimate
determination here are the nature and extent of the burden ... and ... the relative weights of the
state and national interests involved .... ").
43. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986).
44. Felmly, supra note 24, at 476-77; accord Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 578-79 ("When a
state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to
favor instate economic interests ... we have generally struck down the statute .... When .. . a
statute has only indirect effects ... and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether the
State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the
local benefits.").
45. E.g., City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (striking down a law prohib-
iting the importation of waste into New Jersey).
46. E.g., Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579 (noting that the Court will generally strike down
discriminatory regulations "without further inquiry").
47. See 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
48. Pike, 397 U.S. at 139.
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commerce. This test required that courts uphold such statutes "unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. 49 If the state articulates a "legitimate local purpose"
for the regulation, then the court must inquire into the "degree" of the bur-
den and weigh it against the nature of the local interest and whether "it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact."50
B. The Pike Test Fails to Effectively Restrain Extraterritorially
Enforced State Antitrust Laws
The Pike test is an ineffective limit on facially neutral legislation. Objec-
tions to the test range from opposition to courts making legislative value
judgments5' to claims that the standard is too malleable and leads to incon-
sistent judgments.52 Moreover, lower courts have had significant trouble
determining whether this balancing test applies to all evenhanded statutes or
merely those that have a significant discriminatory effect on interstate com-
merce." Such problems have fueled critics of the test, such as Justice
Thomas, who has argued that "[p]recedent as unworkable as our negative
Commerce Clause jurisprudence has become is simply not entitled to the
weight of stare decisis.
The Pike test's shortcomings are not peculiar to antitrust law, but the
problem is especially significant in this context. The balancing test remains
widely used by lower courts, which have applied it as the appropriate
framework for analyzing claims brought under state antitrust laws.55 After
49. Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. E.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that courts are ill-suited to balance benefits and burdens and should rarely take this
approach).
52. E.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 619 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[Olur open-ended balancing tests in this area have allowed ... different
results based merely 'on differing assessments of the force of competing analogies.' ").
53. Compare Grant's Dairy-Me., LLC v. Comm'r of Me. Dep't of Agric., Food & Rural Res.,
232 F.3d 8, 24 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that an evenhanded statute does not trigger the Pike balance
when plaintiff did not illustrate a substantial burden), and Automated Salvage Transp., Inc. v.
Wheelabrator Envtl. Sys., Inc., 155 F.3d 59, 75 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that a regulation must have a
disparate impact between the in-state and out-of-state interests to be invalid under Pike), with E. Ky.
Res. v. Fiscal Ct., 127 F.3d 532, 544 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Even though we do not find that the chal-
lenged provisions directly burden interstate commerce or discriminate against out-of-state interests,
we must nevertheless determine whether their potential benefits outweigh the burdens that they
place on interstate commerce.").
54. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 636 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
55. Heath Consultants, Inc. v. Precision Instruments, Inc., 527 N.W.2d 596, 607 (Neb. 1995)
("State courts upholding the application of state antitrust law as applied to interstate commerce have
reviewed the issue with regard to the test promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc."); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1971) ("[W]here the nature of an
enterprise is such that differing state regulation ... requires the enterprise to comply with the strict-
est standard of several states in order to continue an interstate business extending over many states,
the extra-territorial effect which the application of a particular state law would exact constitutes,
absent a strong state interest, an impermissible burden on interstate commerce."), aff'd, 407 U.S.
December 20071
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all, state antitrust laws are "evenhanded" regulations; they do not discrimi-
nate between in-state or out-of-state parties.56 This poses substantial
problems where a court applies a state's antitrust regulation to conduct oc-
curring wholly out-of-state because Pike requires a court to balance a
regulating state's interest in giving its antitrust laws extraterritorial reach-a
calculation that no court has provided guidance for-against the already
difficult to determine burden on interstate commerce. Likewise, courts can-
not quantify the burden on the other side of the ledger; judges have no way
to determine the weight of the burden on interstate commerce imposed by
subjecting out-of-state corporations to more restrictive regulations. Indeed,
characterizing the exposure to extraterritorial civil liability as an "incidental
burden" on interstate commerce understates its magnitude, especially if li-
ability can be imposed for conduct that was legal, or even mandatory, in the
company's main place of business. 7
Courts applying the Pike balancing test to state antitrust laws exhibit
great confusion over how to characterize the problem with extraterritorial
regulation. For instance, the California Supreme Court invalidated one ex-
traterritorial application of its Cartwright Antitrust Act by resurrecting the
old national-local distinction and concluding that the burden of inconsistent
regulation is excessive because certain topics require national uniformity."
This seems to be the right result, but the court's analysis is confusing be-
cause it claimed to apply the Pike test, then nevertheless discussed the old
national-local test and expressed an undefined concern with inconsistent
regulation. The focus on "inconsistent" laws is especially troubling because,
although the Court has expressed an antagonism toward inconsistent regula-
tions, 9 the primary concern of its jurisprudence in that area is discrimination
among the states. 6°
258 (1972); Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 668 P.2d 674, 689 (Cal. 1983) ("[S]tates
may regulate interstate activity unless ... [the] regulation of the activity imposes an undue burden
upon or discriminates against interstate commerce."); United Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., 629
P.2d 231, 270 (N.M. 1980) (employing the Pike standard to determine the constitutionality of apply-
ing New Mexico's state antitrust laws to interstate commerce).
56. See Partee, 668 P.2d at 695 ("With respect to the requirement that the state law regulate
'even-handedly,' it is the rule that the burden to show discrimination rests on the party challenging
the state regulation .... Clearly, this state's antitrust law is nondiscriminating."). Commentators, too,
have considered whether the Pike test limits the extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust laws.
Malcolm R. Pfunder, Constitutional Limitations on State Antitrust Enforcement, 58 ANTITRUST L.J.
207, 213 (1989) ("The most interesting and difficult issue, in my view, is whether and when a state
antitrust enforcement action might flunk the 'balancing test' under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
It is conceivable that application of state antitrust law to an interstate transaction or activity might
constitute a direct regulation of commerce....").
57. See RLH Indus., Inc. v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 469, 480 (Ct. App. 2005).
58. Partee, 668 P.2d at 677 ("The burden on interstate commerce will ordinarily be found
unreasonable where the state regulation ... governs 'those phases of the national commerce which,
because of the need of national uniformity, demand their regulation ... be prescribed by a single
authority."' (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,767 (1945))).
59. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987).
60. Id. at 87 ("The principal objects of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that
discriminate against interstate commerce.").
(Vol. 106:545
Is there a Dormant Extraterritoriality Principle?
Despite this confusion, the Court's purported concern with inconsistent
regulations is significant because it implies that there is a limit on extraterri-
torial enforcement that does not rely on a balancing test. For instance,
Professor Regan, in his much-cited article analyzing the Court's opinion in
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, suggests that the Court's concern
with inconsistent regulation is actually a substitute for a worry about extra-
territorial legislation.6' Under such a reading, the Court has posited yet
another Commerce Clause limit: a per se prohibition on regulations affect-
62ing out-of-state commerce. This rule, unlike the balancing approach,creates a less malleable and more transparent rule of per se invalidity.
II. THE "EXTRATERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE"
The Extraterritoriality Principle provides a second potential limit-a per
se prohibition-on the application of a state's antitrust laws to conduct oc-
curring predominantly out-of-state. Unlike the malleable Pike test, however,
the Extraterritoriality Principle is susceptible to criticism as too strong a
remedy. Accordingly, this Part addresses the development of the Extraterri-
toriality Principle and observes that while it seems to restrict the out-of-state
63application of state antitrust laws, the principle is a poorly defined and po-
tentially overly restrictive limitation. An unqualified embrace of the
Extraterritoriality Principle requires accepting a standard that is both highly
troublesome for lower courts to apply 64 and threatens the policy of a two-
tiered regime of antitrust laws. This leads to not just inconsistent applica-
tion, but to uncertainty over where the principle is even located within the
Constitution. Section II.A will explore the emergence of the Extraterritori-
ality Principle, with a focus on the line of Supreme Court decisions that
progressively reveal the Court's chief concern to be laws that, when given
extraterritorial force, require out-of-state companies to comply with statutes
conflicting with the laws of their home states. Section II.B then explores the
shortcomings of the Extraterritoriality Principle, especially the Court's
61. Regan, supra note 25, at 1869. Professor Regan attributes some of the confusion to
courts and commentators that characterize the concern with extraterritorial legislation as a Com-
merce Clause problem or a worry about inconsistent regulations. Id. ("[I]t is misleading to suggest
... that extraterritoriality is a commerce clause issue; and it could be disastrously misleading to
refer to the extraterritoriality issue with the language of "'inconsistent regulations.' ").
62. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989) ("[T]he 'Commerce Clause ...
precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's
borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State'...."'.(quoting Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (omission in original))).
63. See id.
64. This principle is difficult for lower courts to apply because, among other things, the
Court has not yet offered a workable explanation of the principle's elements or a standard of review.
Felmly, supra note 24, at 491.
65. Regan, supra note 25, at 1884-85 ("(The truth ... is that the extraterritoriality principle
is not to be located in any particular clause.)... [W]e hardly know how to begin thinking about
what the principle entails in any but the easiest cases."). Professor Regan suggests that the Extrater-
ritoriality Principle fits best as one of the "foundational principles of our federalism" inferred from
the Constitution's structure. Id. at 1885.
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inability to articulate a coherent definition of an "inconsistent" regulation or
to address when conduct occurs wholly out-of-state.
A. Development of the Extraterritoriality Principle
A history of the Extraterritoriality Principle's development reveals that
the rule is a potentially powerful limit on state laws interfering with inter-
state commerce, yet remains an ineffective limit because the Court has
failed to define the type of regulations prohibited by the principle. Accord-
ingly, this Section traces the development of the Court's extraterritoriality
jurisprudence and observes that the rule, if adequately defined, would be a
very strong, per se limit on many state regulations. Nevertheless, this Sec-
tion concludes that the rule has not fulfilled its potential because courts have
not explained when conduct occurs "wholly outside" a state or when regula-
tions are "inconsistent."
The Extraterritoriality Principle emerged as a prohibition on statutes
regulating out-of-state transactions, with the goal of mitigating the regula-
tory chaos created by state "affirmation laws" and "anti-takeover laws,"
which began to proliferate in the 1980s. 6 As early as 1982, a plurality of the
Court invalidated an Illinois law requiring registration of corporate tender
offers because it had "sweeping extraterritorial effect" and "could be applied
to regulate a tender offer which would not affect a single Illinois share-
holder."67 Two years later, the Court struck down a New York price
affirmation law that required distillers to sell liquor in-state at prices no
higher than the lowest prices in other states. 6' The majority reasoned that the
law imposed a direct restraint on commerce because it had the effect of forc-
ing distilleries to abandon promotions in other states, thus compelling those
other states to alter their regulatory regimes. 69
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, the Court clarified its con-
cern with extraterritorial legislation by observing that the Commerce Clause
prohibits laws that "adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting ac-
tivities to inconsistent regulations,"70 thus requiring other states to alter their
regulatory regimes. At issue was the validity of an Indiana law designed to
protect shareholders by providing that an out-of-state entity that bought a
66. Felmly, supra note 24, at 485. "Affirmation laws" require distributors to sell certain
products in-state at the same price as they do out-of-state, and in doing so, effectively fix the prices
that a distributor can charge in out-of-state markets. Id. Antitakeover statutes, on the other hand,
"protect local corporations from hostile tender offers made by companies seeking to take control of
the local 'target' corporation." Id. According to the Healy court, in 1989, twenty states had price
affirmation statutes with potential extraterritorial effects. Healy, 491 U.S. at 334 n. 10.
67. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982). In effect, this case began the use of the
dormant Commerce Clause "as a vehicle to invalidate state regulation thought to overstep its
bounds." Felmly, supra note 24, at 486 n. 151.
68. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 575 (1986).
69. Id. at 583-84. The Court described the extraterritorial reach of the statute, to the extent it
interfered with out-of-state regulatory regimes, as the "most important issue" in the case. Id. at 581.
70. 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987).
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substantial share of an Indiana corporation would not receive voting rights
until the purchase could be approved by a majority of shareholders.' The
Court upheld the Indiana law, but not before suggesting that the Court
would apply a rule of per se invalidity-not a balancing test-to laws that
effectively legislate out-of-state conduct by requiring commerce in other
states to conform to in-state standards.72
The unfortunate shortcoming of CTS Corp. is that the Court failed to de-.• ,73
fine an "inconsistent regulation," and thus declined to give content to a
factor that would have provided a standard for when extraterritorial legisla-
tion might violate the Extraterritoriality Principle. The only explanation
came from Justice Powell who, writing for the majority, indicated that the
line between permissible and invalid legislation may be that a state may
regulate extraterritorially if the regulation also affects a substantial number1 4
of in-state residents. That explanation sheds little light, however, on the
Court's meaning of "inconsistent." Indeed, the Court itself seemed confused,
citing Cooley v. Board of Wardens,7 5 an older case that relied on a distinction
between national and local topics to identify areas where states may regulate
76commerce.
The CTS Court's failure to define "inconsistent regulations" further
muddles the already unclear waters of the dormant Commerce Clause juris-
prudence because several different scenarios may raise worries over
"inconsistent regulations." Professor Regan, discussing the CTS ruling, iden-
tifies at least three constitutional problems, including a worry about
extraterritorial regulation, which courts may discuss in terms of inconsistent• 177
regulations. The most troubling situation may be that judges could read
CTS to prohibit conduct that should raise few, if any, constitutional prob-
lems. For instance, the ordinary usage of "inconsistent regulation" would
71. CTS, 481 U.S. at 72-75.
72. Regan, supra note 25, at 1867. Indeed, Justice Powell explicitly rejected the use of a
balancing test. CTS, 481 U.S. at 92 ("We are not inclined 'to second-guess the empirical judgments
of lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation.'" (quoting Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp.,
450 U.S. 662, 679 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
73. The Court merely noted that the law did not create inconsistent regulations and observed
that every state has general corporate statutes regulating transactions. CTS, 481 U.S. at 89-90. Jus-
tice Powell gave examples of legitimate restrictions such as supermajority voting provisions,
restrictions on payment of dividends, and "staggered board" provisions. Id. at 90.
74. Id. at 93. Justice Powell observed that the Indiana Act applied to "substantial number[s]"
of Indiana shareholders and that even out-of-state application "will affect a substantial number of
Indiana residents." id.
75. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). The Court provided no explanation for how a distinction
between topics of national and local concern related at all to one state passing legislation that would
be "inconsistent" with the laws of another state.
76. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319 ("Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature
national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such
a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.").
77. Regan, supra note 25, at 1884 ("[T]here are at least three genuine constitutional prob-
lems which can reasonably be discussed in terms of avoiding inconsistent regulation by states-two
dormant commerce clause problems (in the areas of taxation and transportation) and one pseudo-
dormant commerce clause problem (extraterritoriality).").
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permit a court to apply the CTS holding to a Minnesota law forbidding the
sale of milk in plastic, nonreturnable containers although North Dakota
permits the sale of milk in plastic jugs. The Minnesota law, however, poses
no constitutional problems.7' Like the antitakeover statute at issue in CTS,
the Minnesota law creates nonuniformity, but not an inconsistent burden.79
In Healy v. Beer Institute,8s the Court attempted its most comprehensive
articulation of the rule against extraterritorial legislation to date, cobbling
together principles from several of its previous extraterritoriality decisions
and attempting to fit them within a Commerce Clause framework. The Court
addressed the constitutionality of a Connecticut price affirmation statute
requiring brewers outside Connecticut to charge prices in Connecticut no
higher than those in other states." Invalidating the statute, the Healy Court
summarized that its extraterritoriality cases stand for the following:
First, the "Commerce Clause ... precludes the application of a state statute
to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders" ....
The critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the regulation is to
control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.... [T]he practical ef-
fect of the statute must be evaluated not only by considering the
consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how the chal-
lenged statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other
States .... [Sipecifically, the Commerce Clause dictates that no State may
force an out-of-state merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State be-
fore undertaking a transaction in another.1
2
The Healy majority reasoned that the Connecticut law not only con-
trolled commercial activity outside the state's borders, but also might
influence other states to create competing regulatory regimes which could
lead to price gridlock on a regional--or conceivably national-scale.83
78. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
79. Professor Regan suggests that the CTS Court's concern is with "inconsistent regulation"
governing a single transaction:
[O]ne of the reasons we want to prohibit extraterritorial legislation is to prevent an actor from
finding herself subject to inconsistent regulations governing one and the same transaction.
(Notice that a Minnesota law governing milk sales in Minnesota and a North Dakota law gov-
erning milk sales in North Dakota will never govern the same transaction, though they may
both affect some milk distributor's packaging behavior in Wisconsin.)
Regan, supra note 25, at 1882. Nevertheless, Professor Regan does not believe that extraterritoriality
is a Commerce Clause problem. Id. at 1873 ("In my opinion, extraterritoriality is not a dormant
commerce clause problem. That is why I can concede that there is an extraterritoriality issue in CTS
and yet claim that the only dormant commerce clause issue is protectionist purpose."). Nor does he
advance "one and the same transaction" as the basis of an actual rule against extraterritorial regula-
tion. Whereas Regan proceeds to argue that we understand neither the constitutional underpinnings
nor a general theory of the Extraterritoriality Principle, id. at 1885, this Note persists in exploring
whether a clearer definition of "inconsistent regulation" may facilitate a Commerce Clause solution
to extraterritoriality problems.
80. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
81. Healy, 491 U.S. at 326.
82. Id. at 336-37 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 337-38.
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Although Chief Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent that a regulation should
not be per se invalid so long as a party has a free choice over whether to
enter into a transaction,4 the majority's holding-taken along with the entire
line of decisions developing the Extraterritoriality Principle-created a doc-
trine that has been observed to strike down state regulations extending
beyond the borders of the enacting state using a per se rule of invalidity. s5
Regrettably, the Healy Court's attempt to clarify its extraterritoriality
cases did nothing to answer questions about the meaning of "inconsistent"
and raised new concerns over when regulations control conduct "wholly
outside" a state. The majority left unanswered most of the questions left
over from the CTS decision; indeed, the Court's summary notably does not
even include the word "inconsistent." Aspects of Healy, however, suggest
that the doctrine remains concerned with imposing inconsistent legal bur-
dens. Indeed, the prohibition on regulations forcing merchants "to seek
regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in an-
other 86 appears on its face to support Professor Regan's definition of
inconsistent regulations as those affecting the "same transaction.8 s Of equal
concern is the Court's revival of a "direct-indirect" distinctionS-a relic of
its older Commerce Clause jurisprudence9--and its insistence that the rule
applies only to conduct occurring "wholly outside" a state. The Court of-
fered no satisfying line to distinguish conduct "wholly outside" a state's
borders from conduct "mostly" or "predominantly" outside. 9' Thus, read
literally, the rule does not prevent state laws from creating conflicting regu-
latory obligations unless there is absolutely no in-state involvement.
The Extraterritoriality Principle seems intuitively simple, yet courts
struggle to apply the principle consistently, much less to define the scope of
conduct it applies to. Thus, although the rule is a per se prohibition that pro-
hibits all extraterritorial regulation of a certain type, we still do not know
84. Id. at 347.
85. Felmly, supra note 24, at 490.
86. Healy,, 491 U.S. at 337 (emphasis added).
87. Regan, supra note 25, at 1882.
88. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336-37. ("[A] statute that directly controls commerce occurring
wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State's authority
89. See, e.g., U.S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 326 (1918) ("It is settled
that a State may not directly burden interstate commerce, either by taxation or otherwise. But a tax
that only indirectly affects the profits or returns from such commerce is not within the rule." (em-
phasis added)).
90. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
91. The usefulness of a rigid in-state/out-of-state distinction seems particularly small consid-
ering the current interdependence of state economies and the permeability of state borders. It seems
untenable that this distinction could survive at a time when strict territorial limitations on due proc-
ess have vanished, see Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and personal




what that type of prohibited regulation is.92 Accordingly, the rule remains a
powerful tool to restrain extraterritorial legislation, but a tool which most
courts remain confused over when to use and what to use it for.
B. The Extraterritoriality Principle Fails to Effectively
Restrain State Antitrust Laws
The Extraterritoriality Principle has the potential to restrain the extrater-
ritorial enforcement of many state laws, but the rule's shortcomings make it
too potentially broad and too poorly defined to effectively restrain the out-
of-state enforcement of state antitrust laws. This Section examines the Ex-
traterritoriality Principle's shortcomings as a potential limit on state antitrust
laws and concludes that the Court's failure to define "inconsistent regula-
tions" makes the rule ambiguous and overinclusive. Moreover, the rule's
potentially sweeping breadth would threaten to undermine the balance be-
tween federal and state antitrust regulation.
The Extraterritoriality Principle at first appears to be a powerful tool
with a great capacity to restrain the out-of-state application of state antitrust
laws. Courts already apply the rule to invalidate price affirmation and anti-
takeover statutes93 that, like a state's antitrust laws, proscribe certain
commercial behavior and particularly, like affirmation laws, restrict corpora-
tions' pricing decisions. The rule's application in those scenarios suggests
94that it might also effectively restrain state antitrust laws. Faced with a
situation in which a transaction occurs in state Alpha, but is potentially sub-
ject to both the antitrust laws of state Alpha and the extraterritorially applied
law of state Bravo, the principle would appear to invalidate the application
of state Bravo's law to the extent it would brand as illegal a transaction that
is lawful under the law of state Alpha.
Application of the Extraterritoriality Principle to state antitrust laws may
lead to starkly different results than the Pike test, despite the Supreme
Court's assertion that both originate in the dormant Commerce Clause.95
While an evenhanded regulation will ordinarily survive the lesser scrutiny of
the balancing test, such a law is per se invalid when it comes within the
96reach of the Extraterritoriality Principle. This phenomenon occurs because
92. The very existence of the Pike balancing test indicates that some laws and regulations
will be subject to a balancing of interests and not a per se rule. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970).
93. E.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
94. One commentator has suggested that decisions like Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1982), in which the Court struck down an Illinois antitakeover statute as a "direct restraint on inter-
state commerce," id. at 642, may affect potential limits on the application of state antitrust laws. See
David W. Lamb, Avoiding Impotence: Rethinking the Standards for AppIying State Antitrust Laws to
Interstate Commerce, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1747 n.295 (2001). Interestingly, the Court also ob-
served that even were the law not a direct restraint on commerce, it could still be invalidated as an
indirect restraint under the Pike test. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643. Here, it seems, the Court may pick and
choose its weapons from its dormant Commerce Clause doctrine jurisprudence. See id.
95. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579.
96. Felmly, supra note 24, at 484.
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the Court has instructed judges to apply the Extraterritoriality Principle
when a state's regulation has the "practical effect" of controlling conduct
beyond the state's boundaries. 97 State antitrust laws, when construed to have
extraterritorial effect, are just such evenhanded regulations posing restric-
tions on commerce outside the state's boundaries. As such, they are
excellent candidates to fall under the principle.
The ambiguities of the Extraterritoriality Principle, however, make the
rule both over- and underinclusive, and thus no more significantly useful a
limit than the Pike test. The Court has failed to define "inconsistent" laws or
explain when commerce is "wholly outside" a state.9 While commentators
suggest that an inconsistent regulation is one that subjects a transaction to
incompatible obligations,99 this rule could be overinclusive by invalidating
numerous state laws that affect, but do not necessarily control, interstate
transactions.'0° For instance, the extraterritorial regulation of state Alpha
might require that all products of a certain type must be sold with a specific
label, and would thus require a manufacturer of that product in state Bravo
to change its labeling in order to make sales in Alpha. This is the kind of
burden that would ordinarily be subject to the Pike test," but a confused
court might reason that state Bravo does not require that labeling and deem
the regulation "inconsistent." Moreover, the Healy court's explanation that
the principle applies to conduct "wholly outside" the state10 2 unduly limits
its application. Thus the principle would be incapable of invalidating the
application of state Bravo's law that condemned conduct made mandatory
by the law of state Alpha, even though the tiniest fraction of the transaction
occurred in state Bravo. Without clarifying these two premises of the rule,
judges will continue to apply the rule in a guesswork manner, thus creating
"unpredictable legal standards and inconsistent decisions."1
03
97. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
98. Felmly, supra note 24, at 491.
99. E.g., Regan, supra note 25, at 1882.
100. See Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 180 F. Supp. 2d 392 (N.D.N.Y. 2001)
(striking down an emergency regulation restricting lobstering on Commerce Clause grounds). Mr.
Felmly asserts that this regulation did not compel any extraterritorial compliance but only affected
businesses once they made a choice to enter a transaction in New York. Felmly, supra note 24, at
497 n.247. Although the regulation certainly affected interstate commerce, it did not control the
transactions of out-of-state businesses: their choice to do business in New York was voluntary. Id.
101. The requirements are evenhanded and apply to all manufacturers regardless of their place
of business, so that any burdens on commerce would be purely incidental. See Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
102. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
103. Felmly, supra note 24, at 492. For example, the Seventh Circuit, affirming a district
court's invalidation of a Wisconsin law governing milk prices on grounds that it was extraterritorial
legislation governing conduct in Illinois, rejected the claim that numerous contacts with the Illinois-
based plaintiff meant that some sales contracts were formed inside Wisconsin. Dean Foods Co. v.
Brancel, 187 F.3d 609, 619 (7th Cir. 1999). But cf Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum
Corp., 35 F.3d 813, 825 (3rd Cir. 1994) (reasoning that contract matters involving multiple states
involve "difficult choice-of-law question[s]" and that by coming to an agreement, the parties agreed
to have the law apply to their situation and impliedly gave the law extraterritorial force).
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The Court's reluctance to define an "inconsistent" regulation is espe-
cially problematic in the antitrust context because, although some
extraterritorial antitrust regulation is likely prohibited, courts cannot deter-
mine when regulations cross the line. After all, state laws may be in tension
without creating a direct conflict,'04 and the principle offers no discernible
test for when laws become "inconsistent." Seizing on the lack of clear
boundaries, at least one court has suggested that these limits may not exist at
all.' ° 5 Nevertheless, surely some conduct is too attenuated from the interest
of the state legislature to be within the reach of its laws. One commentator
has thus suggested that court decisions striking down price affirmation and
antitakeover laws like Edgar v. MITE,'°6 in which the Court struck down an
Illinois antitakeover statute as a "direct restraint on interstate commerce,"
maintain hope for the principle's use as a limit on the application of state
antitrust laws.1
0 7
Adopting the Extraterritoriality Principle as a limit on the reach of state
antitrust laws may also undermine the policy of maintaining a two-tiered
approach to antitrust regulation involving both federal and state laws. °8 Fed-
eral and state antitrust laws have existed harmoniously for over a century,
with state laws creating an important supplemental forum for plaintiffs to
seek redress for anticompetitive conduct.'0 9 Aggressive extraterritorial appli-
cation of state laws threatens that balance, but a broad reading of the
Extraterritoriality Principle may not restore equilibrium. Implementing a per
se rule against any extraterritorial legislation could enable judges to apply
the rule more consistently, but at the cost of tipping the balance too heavily
in the other direction, in favor of federal dominance. That result would re-
move many of the benefits that Congress created by allowing state laws to
supplement federal laws, such as permitting plaintiffs who have standing
under state law to avail themselves of more flexible state procedures.'' 0
104. State Alpha's regulatory regime might, for instance, impose requirements that are differ-
ent from the regulations of state Bravo but do not necessarily conflict with the law of state Alpha.
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), offers an example. The Court held
that the Indiana antitakeover statute was not an "inconsistent" regulation, id. at 89, but that it never-
theless created an extra obstacle to buying a stake in an Indiana corporation that the out-of-state
purchaser would not have faced if it sought to buy a share of a company in its home state, id. at 93-
94.
105. Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1971) ("Our difficulty lies in determining to
what extent, if at all, the states are precluded from antitrust regulation of interstate commerce."),
aff'd on other grounds, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
106. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982). The Court has also used the Extraterri-
toriality Principle to strike down laws affecting pricing arrangements. E.g., Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
107. See Lamb, supra note 94, at 1747 n.295.
108. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) ("If the combination is confined to a State the State should
apply the remedy; if it is interstate and controls any production in many States, Congress must apply
the remedy.").
109. Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 375.
110. Id.
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The dormant Commerce Clause permits states to apply their own anti-
trust laws to reach some out-of-state conduct,"' but the Court has never
adequately clarified when extraterritorial regulation goes beyond the Com-
merce Clause's limits. For instance, the Healy majority clarified that states
may not apply their laws to conduct "wholly outside" the state,"'2 and the
CTS Court indicated that judges will sometimes invalidate extraterritorial
regulation if it is "inconsistent" with the second state's regulatory regime. " '
Unfortunately, the Court has not defined either standard in a way that judges
can meaningfully apply."4 The lack of clarity leaves judges with the unenvi-
able task of determining whether to apply the permissive Pike test or the
powerful Extraterritoriality Principle. The former is too nuanced and cannot
be consistently applied by the lower courts, but the latter may be too strong
a medicine, creating a total bar on extraterritorial regulation and undermin-
ing the purpose of having both federal and state antitrust laws.
III. THE "INCONSISTENCY PRINCIPLE" AS A RESTRAINT
ON STATE ANTITRUST LAWS
This Note proposes a new rule, the Inconsistency Principle, as an alter-
native limit on the extraterritorial enforcement of state antitrust laws. Under
the Inconsistency Principle, courts should invalidate any regulation that cre-
ates an "inconsistent legal obligation." A regulation will create inconsistent
obligations when it requires a party to choose between following the rules of
its home state or of the regulating state, so that a choice to follow one state's
law will require breaking the law in another state. This is a narrow rule that
would apply to only a small amount of extraterritorial regulation," 5 but
would effectively restrain state antitrust laws by imposing a clear and easily
applied per se prohibition. At the same time, because the Inconsistency
Principle would invalidate only the most onerous extraterritorial regulation,
it would leave ample room for state antitrust laws to function as they tradi-
tionally have-in harmony with the federal antitrust regime.
Ill. Id. at 431 ("The commerce clause of the United States Constitution is not a substantial
barrier to the application of a state's antitrust law to activities occurring outside the state.").
112. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989).
113. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87-88 (1987).
114. At least one commentator has suggested that the confusion can be alleviated by the re-
quirement that states only pursue claims against those whom they already have personal jurisdiction
over. Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 432 ("As a matter of policy, extraterritorial application of state
antitrust law ought to be limited to those instances when the state court has specific personal juris-
diction over the defendant or when the cause of action arises out of the defendant's activities within
the forum state."). This solution is unsatisfying because the Court has made clear that extraterritori-
ality is a Commerce Clause problem and it is the Commerce Clause standards, both the permissive
Pike test and the Extraterritoriality Principle, that are flawed. See Healy, 491 U.S. at 336-37.
115. Many extraterritorial regulations will not create inconsistent legal obligations. For in-
stance, the Indiana regulation in CTS Corp., 481 U.S. 69, had extraterritorial effects, but it did not




The "Inconsistency Principle" would be a dormant Commerce Clause
rule and fit within the Court's extraterritoriality jurisprudence, but is distinct
from both the Pike test and the Extraterritoriality Principle. Unlike the Pike
test, the Inconsistency Principle would provide a straightforward, unambi-
guous analysis that does not require any balancing. A regulation's validity
would not depend on whether it creates "clearly excessive" burdens;' 16 a law
would be invalid if it creates an inconsistent legal obligation, forcing the
regulated party to choose between following the law of one state or another.
Moreover, the Inconsistency Principle would be distinct from the Extraterri-
toriality Principle because it provides a clear, narrow definition of
"inconsistent"-a term that the Court has failed to define over the course of
its extraterritoriality jurisprudence"-and dispenses with the requirement
that, to apply, conduct must occur "wholly outside" the state."8 The Incon-
sistency Principle would thus prevent the worst mischief caused by
extraterritorially applied laws in a way that is neither overinclusive, like the
Extraterritoriality Principle, nor overly malleable, like the Pike test.
The Inconsistency Principle would provide a straightforward approach
to the largest problems created by extraterritorial antitrust laws. Imagine two
states, Alpha and Bravo. Alpha construes its antitrust law broadly and its
courts will give the statute extraterritorial effect. Meanwhile, Bravo's public
utilities commission gives its filed utility tariffs the full force of law and will
prosecute any departure from the conditions of service that are on file. Sup-
pose that Bravo's public utility commission requires that a certain uniform
type of device must be used on all high-voltage lines and, as the only feasi-
ble way of complying, the utility issues a condition of service that it will be
the sole provider of these devices. Meanwhile, a manufacturer of these same
devices in Alpha wishes to market its product in Bravo, but has its efforts
frustrated by this tariff. Under Alpha's antitrust laws, that manufacturer can
then sue the utility in Bravo, alleging a tying arrangement. The utility thus
finds itself with the dilemma of either violating the law of Alpha by adher-
ing to the tariff provision, or violating Bravo's law by opening its market to
the device manufacturer. The utility is subject to two inconsistent legal obli-
gations and, no matter what choice it makes, it will break the law of one of
the states." 9 In this situation, the Inconsistency Principle would invalidate
the application of Alpha's antitrust law.
The above example illustrates why the Inconsistency Principle would re-
spond to the problem of extraterritorially enforced antitrust laws more
efficiently than the Pike balancing test. Courts could invalidate the applica-
tion of Alpha's laws under the dormant Commerce Clause balancing test,
but that result is not assured. A court applying the Pike test must inquire
whether applying the law of Alpha creates a burden on interstate commerce
116. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
117. Felmly, supra note 24, at 491.
118. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
119. This is one of the theories advanced by the defense in RLH Industries, Inc. v. SBC Com-
munications, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 469, 481 (Ct. App. 2005).
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that is "clearly excessive" compared to Bravo's interest in regulating its pub-
lic utilities.'20 The outcome of the Pike test thus depends on a judge
weighing the judicial equivalent of apples to oranges because courts provide
no guidance on how to characterize either interest, much less compare their
weights. In contrast, the Inconsistency Principle would not be susceptible to
such arbitrary results because it invokes a per se prohibition against laws
like Alpha's, which created an inconsistent legal obligation by forcing the
utility to choose whether to follow the law of Alpha or of Bravo.
The Inconsistency Principle would be superior to the Extraterritoriality
Principle as a solution to the problem of extraterritorial antitrust regulation.
A judge could apply the line of extraterritoriality cases to hold that Alpha's
enforcement of its own antitrust laws in Bravo is per se invalid,12 but to do
so he would have to discern whether it involved conduct that subjects com-
merce to "inconsistent regulations"'' 22 or regulated commerce "wholly
outside" the state. ' The Extraterritoriality Principle provides a powerful
solution if both conditions are met, but the Court has not provided adequate
definitions to determine when a regulation is inconsistent. As a result, a
judge has no guidance to determine whether Alpha's regulation creates "in-
consistent" regulations and may thus refuse to apply the Extraterritoriality
Principle in this and similar circumstances. 24 Moreover, the Extraterritorial-
ity Principle might not apply at all if the utility in Bravo had subsidiaries or
did some business in Alpha because the commerce might no longer be
"wholly outside" the state. In contrast, courts could easily apply the Incon-
sistency Principle to the situation because it would provide a specific
definition of "inconsistent" and dispense with the "wholly outside" require-
ment. In effect, the rule would apply the "strong medicine" of the
Extraterritoriality Principle to a focused, well-defined category of impermis-
sible regulation.
The Inconsistency Principle is intentionally narrow in order to prevent
interference with the two-tiered antitrust regime. 2 Its goal would be to pro-
tect the equilibrium between federal and state laws against the threat of
extraterritorially applied state regulations, not to shift the balance in favor of
federal law. Nevertheless, recognizing that state antitrust laws are invalid
when they place inconsistent legal burdens on out-of-state defendants pre-
vents the most dangerous harm threatened by extraterritorial antitrust laws.
120. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
121. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336-37.
122. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87-88 (1987).
123. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
124. See RLH Indus., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 478-79 (refusing to apply Healy where the facts
alleged by SBC were essentially identical to this hypothetical).
125. This rule could be criticized as underinclusive to the extent that it permits much extrater-
ritorial legislation, only invalidating those that create inconsistent legal obligations. This
shortcoming, if it holds any merit, is intentional. Both federal and state governments are tasked with




It would answer the worries of commentators who fear that a trend towards
extraterritorial application will create havoc by exposing parties to inconsis-




The Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is far too murky
and confused to handle a problem as potentially threatening as the aggres-
sive extraterritorial application of state antitrust laws. The lack of clear lines
between the doctrine's current rules makes it possible to apply either the oft-
maligned Pike test or the sweeping Extraterritoriality Principle. 27 This con-
fusion exacerbates the problem because application of either rule can lead to
contradictory results, and is especially dangerous where one standard is so
malleable as to permit almost any out-of-state effect while the other is so
powerful as to potentially forbid every out-of-state effect. Such a situation
begs for clarity.
The Inconsistency Principle offers the virtues of both limits while avoid-
ing their greatest vices. By invalidating extraterritorially applied laws only
when they require regulated parties to choose which state's laws to follow,
the Inconsistency Principle would still permit a great deal of extraterritorial
legislation and would maintain the two-tiered federal and state regimes con-
templated by Congress. Additionally, by limiting the rule to only a narrow
category of extraterritorial legislation, this rule would not be as overinclu-
sive as the Extraterritoriality Principle. The end result by no means resolves
the convoluted intersection of the dormant Commerce Clause and extraterri-
toriality cases, but it does ameliorate an increasingly troubling problem.
126. See GRVE, supra note 8, at 5 ("[T]he danger [is] that one state might punish defendants
for conduct that may have been entirely lawful in other states"); Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 432
("Aggressive application of state antitrust law on a nationwide scale can play havoc with the two-
tier, federal-state antitrust enforcement scheme....").
127. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)
("We have also recognized that there is no clear line separating the category of state regulation that
is virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause, and the category subject to the Pike v. Burce
Church balancing approach.").
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